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Knowing	  is	  trusting?	  	  
An	  experimental	  test	  of	  the	  role	  of	  information	  in	  advisory	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Abstract.	  The	  recent	  economic	  crisis	  still	  lingering	  in	  Europe	  has	  deeply	  affected	  the	  way	  individuals	  look	  at	  
the	  investment	  market.	  Understanding	  the	  trust	  processes	  underlying	  the	  decision	  to	  invest	  with	  financial	  
intermediaries	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  both	  at	  managerial	  (product	  development	  and	  advertisement)	  
and	  at	  normative	  level	  (how	  intermediaries	  are	  regulated).	  Using	  an	  online	  experiment,	  this	  paper	  
investigates	  whether	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  financial	  literacy	  of	  investors	  and	  brokers	  can	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  
the	  decision	  to	  trust	  –	  thus,	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  financial	  market.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  trust	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  
information	  disclosure	  in	  somewhat	  unexpected	  ways.	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1. Introduction	  
The	  corporate	  scandals	  broken	  out	  in	  all	  major	  economies	  since	  2000	  (e.g.	  WorldCom,	  Enron,	  
Parmalat,	  Bear	  Sterns,	  up	   to	  Lehman	  Brothers	  and	  AIG)	  and	   the	  economic	  crisis	   still	   lingering	   in	  
Europe	   have	   deeply	   affected	   the	   level	   of	   trust	   of	   individuals,	   both	   expert	   and	   non-­‐expert,	   in	  
financial	  markets	  and	  financial	  advisors.	  Understanding	  the	  trust	  processes	  underlying	  the	  decision	  
to	   participate	   in	   financial	  markets	   is	   very	   important	   both	   at	  managerial	   and	   at	   normative	   level.	  
From	   the	   managerial	   point	   of	   view,	   understanding	   the	   factors	   that	   influence	   the	   investment	  
process	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  particular	  kinds	  of	  financial	  products	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  financial	  
institutions,	   both	   for	   the	   design	   and	   for	   the	   advertisement	   and	   distribution	   of	   the	   products	  
themselves.	   From	   the	   normative	   point	   of	   view,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   investigate	   the	   mechanisms	  
guiding	   individuals’	   saving	   behaviour	   in	   order	   to	   regulate	   the	   markets,	   which	   needs	   to	   be	  
reorganized	  according	  to	  the	  public	  opinion.	  
This	   research	  aims	  at	   enriching	   the	   literature	  about	   trust	   in	   financial	  markets,	   focusing	  on	  a	  
specific	  aspect	  of	  the	  process	  of	  market	  participation:	  the	  role	  played	  by	  financial	  advisors.	  
There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  streams	  of	  research	  investigating	  financial	  advisory:	  the	  first	  one	  focuses	  
on	  investors’	  characteristics	  and	  how	  they	  can	  influence	  the	  search	  for	  advisory	  (Bernheim,	  1998;	  
Lusardi	   e	   Mitchell,	   2006;	   van	   Rooij	   et	   al.,	   2011);	   the	   second	   one	   looks	   at	   the	   role	   played	   by	  
advisors	   in	   influencing	   investors’	   participation	   in	   the	   financial	   market	   (Collins,	   2010;	   Inderst,	  
Ottaviani,	   2009).	   This	   research	   belongs	   to	   the	   first	   stream	   of	   literature	   and	   investigates	   trust	  
between	   investors	  and	  advisors	   through	  an	  experimental	  analysis.	   In	  particular,	  we	  address	   two	  
main	  research	  questions:	  the	  first	  one	  aims	  at	  verifying	  if	  the	  financial	  literacy	  of	  advisors	  affects	  
the	  level	  of	  trust	  they	  receive;	  the	  second	  one	  looks	  at	  how	  trust	  changes	  when	  we	  have/have	  not	  
information	   about	   the	   advisor,	   independently	   on	   his/her	   level	   of	   financial	   literacy.	   Answering	  
these	   two	   questions	   can	   help	   shed	   further	   light	   on	   the	   current	   debate	   regarding	   the	  
trustworthiness	  of	  financial	  markets	  and	  may	  have	  significant	  policy	  implications.	  	  
	  
	  
2. Literature	  review	  
Several	   studies	   in	   economics	   and	   finance	   have	   tried	   to	   determine	   why	   stock	   market	  
participation	   is	   so	   scant	   (Haliassos	   and	   Bertaut,	   1995;	   Guiso	   et	   al.,	   2001).	   Information	   and	  
transaction	  costs	  are	  listed	  among	  the	  major	  reasons	  why	  individuals	  fail	  to	  invest	  their	  money	  and	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savings	   (Vissing-­‐Jorgensen,	   2004).	   In	   fact,	   the	   investment	   process	   is	   time	   consuming:	   investors	  
must	  collect	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  information	  regarding	  companies,	  institutions	  and	  countries	  whose	  
securities	   they	  want	   to	   buy.	  Moreover,	   they	   incur	   costs	   for	   the	   trading	   activity	   (buying,	   selling	  
securities)	  and	  for	  the	  advisory,	  in	  case	  they	  decide	  to	  entrust	  the	  management	  of	  their	  money	  to	  
a	  financial	  professional.	  	  
More	  recently,	  academics	  have	  tried	  to	  motivate	  the	  inadequate	  stock	  market	  participation	  
focusing	   on	   more	   intrinsic	   reasons:	   the	   tendency	   to	   underinvest	   could	   derive	   from	   an	   overall	  
financial	  illiteracy	  (Lusardi	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  i.e.	  from	  individuals	  not	  being	  sufficiently	  familiar	  with	  the	  
basics	  of	  economics	  and	  finance.	  Nationwide	  surveys	  showed	  that	  in	  US	  (Lusardi	  e	  Mitchell,	  2007),	  
Netherlands	   (Van	  Rooij	   et.	  Al.,	   2011)	   and	  other	   European	   countries	   (Christelis	   et	   al.,	   2010)	  only	  
one	   third	   of	   individuals	   are	   able	   to	   answer	   correctly	   three	   simple	   questions	   regarding	   basic	  
economic	   principles,	   like	   the	   compounding	   of	   interests,	   the	   role	   of	   inflation	   on	   the	   purchasing	  
power	   and	   the	  different	   riskiness	  of	   financial	   securities	   (liquidity,	   stocks,	   bonds).	  Moreover,	   the	  
financial	   illiteracy	   influences	   the	  quality	  of	   financial	  decisions.	   In	   fact,	   less	   literate	   individuals	  do	  
not	   plan	   for	   retirement	   (Van	   Rooij	   et	   al.,	   2001;	   Lusardi	   e	  Mitchell,	   2008),	   do	   not	   invest	   in	   the	  
financial	   market	   (Van	   Rooij	   et.	   Al.,	   2011),	   diversify	   less	   their	   investment	   portfolios	   (Guiso	   e	  
Jappelli,	   2009),	   save	   less	   (Bayer	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Cole	   e	   Shastry,	   2009),	   use	   more	   debt	   (Lusardi	   e	  
Tufano,	  2009)	  and,	  consequently,	  are	  less	  rich	  (Lusardi	  e	  Mitchell,	  2007).	  
Other	  studies	   reveal	   that,	   income	  and	  wealth	  being	  equal,	   there	  are	  differences	   in	   the	  stock	  
market	  participation	  based	  also	  on	  geographical	  factors	  (Guiso	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  For	  example,	  the	  stock	  
market	   participation	   of	   low-­‐income	   families	   in	   Sweden,	   Denmark	   and	   Switzerland	   is	  more	   than	  
double	  than	  in	  Austria,	  Spain	  and	  Italy.	  Guiso	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  also	  show	  that	  Italian	  families	  tend	  to	  
invest	  more	   in	   the	   regions	  where	  blood	  donation	   rates	   are	  higher,	   the	  electoral	   participation	   is	  
greater	   and	   people	   trust	  more	   their	   neighbours.	   Thus,	   other	   factors	   affecting	   the	   stock	  market	  
participation	   are	   trust	   (Gambetta,	   1998)	   and	   sociability:	  a	   high	   level	   of	   trust,	   together	  with	   the	  
network	  a	  person	  belongs	  to,	  impact	  on	  the	  willingness	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  financial	  market	  (Guiso	  et	  
al.,	   2008,	   Georgarakos,	   Pasini,	   2011).	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   lack	   of	   trust	   and	   the	   fear	   of	   being	  
cheated	  deter	  households	  from	  investing.	  
Judging	   from	   this	   literature,	   financial	   literacy	   and	   trust	   seem	   to	   play	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	  
determining	   individual	   investment	  behaviour.	   Thus,	   recent	   studies	   tried	   to	  analyze	   the	  effect	  of	  
these	  variables	  on	  the	  stock	  market	  participation,	  also	  focusing	  on	  the	  role	  that	  advisory	  can	  play	  
in	  helping	  individuals	  to	  efficiently	  allocate	  their	  money.	  Collins	  (2010)	  suggests	  financial	  advisory	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as	   a	   possible	   solution	   of	   the	   financial	   illiteracy	   problem.	   However,	   the	   delegation	   process	  
underlying	   advisory	   and	   financial	   intermediation	   is	   not	   straightforward	   and	   is	   characterised	   by	  
some	  critical	  features:	  first,	  investors	  could	  face	  a	  counterpart	  that	  does	  not	  make	  their	  interests,	  
thus	   increasing	  their	  mistrust;	  second,	  the	  advisors/brokers	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  conflict	  of	   interests,	  
being	  themselves	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  seller,	  whose	  products	  they	  are	  offering	  to	  investors	  
(Inderst,	  Ottaviani,	  2009).	  Even	  if	  the	  advisors	  were	  subject	  to	  a	  conflict	  of	  interests,	  they	  could	  be	  
incentivized	  to	  suggest	  a	  buy	  rather	  than	  a	  sell	  because	  the	  former	  generates	  higher	  commissions	  
or	   because	   an	   optimist	   broker	   can	   have	   better	   relations	   with	   the	   company,	   whose	   securities	  
he/she	   is	   selling	   (Krausz	   and	   Paroush,	   2002).	   For	   all	   these	   reasons,	   trust	   is	   the	   fundamental	  
prerequisite	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  money	  transfer	  from	  the	  investor	  to	  the	  advisor	  possible.	  Recent	  
studies	   showed	   that	   the	   lack	  of	   trust	   in	   the	   financial	   system	  and	   in	   the	   financial	   intermediaries	  
reduces	   the	  probability	  of	   investing	   in	   the	  stock	  market.	  Guiso	  et	  al.	   (2008)	   find	   that	   those	  who	  
trust	  their	  neighbour	  more	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  buy	  stocks	  and,	  once	  they	  decide	  to	  participate	  in	  
the	  stock	  market,	  they	  buy	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  securities.	  Likewise,	  Pasini	  and	  Georgarakos	  (2009)	  
find	   a	   positive	   relation	   between	   trust	   in	   financial	   institutions	   and	   stock	  market	   participation	   in	  
several	  countries.	  The	  reason	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that,	  when	  the	  investor	  is	  afraid	  of	  being	  cheated,	  the	  
expected	  return	  of	  the	  investment	  decreases	  but,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  high	  enough,	  the	  investor	  will	  prefer	  
to	   stay	   out	   of	   the	   market.	   Trust	   in	   financial	   institutions	   has	   a	   direct	   impact	   also	   on	   the	  
participation	  in	  the	  US	  401(k)	  retirement	  saving	  plans.	  	  
Besides	  trust,	  another	  relevant	  issue	  when	  deciding	  to	  rely	  on	  financial	  advisory	  concerns	  the	  
financial	   skills	  of	   the	  advisor	  and	   the	   investor.	   It	   is	  proven	   that	  more	   literate	   individuals	   choose	  
“better”	  consultancy,	  i.e.	  they	  prefer	  professionals	  to	  relatives	  or	  friends	  (Bernheim,	  1998;	  Lusardi	  
e	  Mitchell,	   2006;	   van	  Rooij	   et	   al.,	   2007).	  Moreover	   they	  will	   have	   an	   easier	   access	   to	   the	   stock	  
market,	  given	  that	  literate	  investors	  are	  more	  able	  to	  understand	  financial	  instruments.	  Van	  Rooij	  
et	   al.	   (2007)	   highlight	   that	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   financial	   literacy	   is	   associated	   with	   higher	   stock	  
market	  participation.	  However,	  the	  relation	  between	  financial	  literacy	  and	  the	  search	  for	  advisory	  
is	   not	   obvious.	   On	   one	   side,	   one	   would	   expect	   that	   the	   less	   literate	   an	   investor	   is,	   the	   higher	  
his/her	   quest	   for	   advisory	   is.	   However,	   it	   is	   proven	   that	   this	   relation	   is	   positive	   only	  when	   the	  
investor:	  a)	  is	  less	  overconfident	  (Kruger	  e	  Dunning,	  1999);	  b)	  has	  a	  higher	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  time	  
(Hacketal	   et	   al.,	   2012);	   c)	   sees	   advisory	   as	   a	   complementary	   source	   of	   information	   (Calcagno	   e	  
Monticone,	  2011);	  d)	  believes	  that	  advisors	  provide	  the	  best	  investment	  advise	  (Bucher-­‐Koenen	  e	  
Koenen,	  2011);	  e)	  is	  less	  impatient	  (Frederick,	  2005).	  Instead,	  the	  relation	  is	  negative	  when	  more	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literate	   individuals	   are	   more	   aware	   of	   the	   conflict	   of	   interests	   between	   advisors	   and	   clients	  
(Hackethal,	   Inderst	   e	   Meyer,	   2011),	   when	   they	   do	   not	   see	   the	   need	   of	   being	   assisted	   by	   a	  
professional	   as	   they	   are	   able	   to	   process	   all	   information	   by	   themselves,	   having	   better	   skills	   and	  
being	  part	  of	  the	  best	  social	  networks	  (Korniotis	  e	  Kumar,	  2013),	  or	  when	  they	  are	  less	  risk	  averse	  
(Frederick,	  2005).	  
The	  studies	  that	  try	  to	  put	  together	  trust,	  financial	  literacy	  and	  advisory	  are	  still	  few	  and	  their	  
results	   are	   somewhat	   contradictory.	   In	   this	   respect,	   one	   of	   the	   first	   contributions	   belongs	   to	  
Monticone	  (2010),	  who	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  high	  level	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  advisor	  together	  with	  good	  
financial	  skills	   increases	  the	  probability	  to	  hold	  risky	  assets.	  Moreover,	  the	  same	  study	  highlights	  
that	  trusting	  the	  financial	  advisor	  increases	  the	  propensity	  to	  follow	  his/her	  recommendation.	  On	  
the	   contrary,	   the	   financial	   literacy	  helps	   investors	   to	   avoid	  non-­‐professional	   sources	  of	   advisory	  
but,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   reduces	   the	  probability	   to	   look	   for	  an	  advisor,	  being	   the	   investor	  able	   to	  
invest	   autonomously.	   Studying	   the	   relation	   between	   financial	   literacy	   and	   search	   for	   advisory,	  
Calcagno	  and	  Monticone	  (2011)	  find	  that	  less	  literate	  investors	  either	  invest	  more	  independently	  
or	   delegate	   the	   whole	   management	   of	   their	   portfolio.	   Instead,	   Kramer	   (2012)	   finds	   that	   the	  
perceived	  level	  of	  financial	  expertise	  is	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  search	  for	  financial	  advisory,	  
while	  the	  measured	  financial	  literacy	  and	  the	  cognitive	  abilities	  are	  not	  correlated	  with	  the	  search	  
for	   advisory.	   This	   result	   shows	   that	   advisory	   is	   not	   a	   sufficient	   condition	   to	   fully	  offset	   financial	  
illiteracy.	   The	   author	   discovers	   that	   individuals	   with	   a	   lower	   schooling	   level	   and	   a	   lower	   risk	  
attitude	  tend	  to	  rely	  less	  on	  financial	  advisors,	  whereas	  older	  and	  richer	  individuals	  tend	  to	  trust	  
advisors	  more	  and	  to	  use	  all	  their	  services.	  	  
This	  research	  tries	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  this	  debate	  and	  offers	  an	  original	  contribution:	  by	  using	  an	  
experimental	  approach,	  we	  investigate	  the	  relation	  between	  trust	  towards	  an	  advisor	  and	  financial	  
literacy	  (of	  both	  parts)	  in	  the	  investment	  process.	  	  
	  
	  
3. An	  experiment	  on	  trust	  and	  financial	  literacy	  
	  
I. The	  Trust	  game	  
The	   framework	   chosen	   to	   assess	   the	   impact	   of	   perceived	   financial	   literacy	   on	   trust	   between	   a	  
client	  and	  his	  broker	   is	   the	  classic	  Trust	  game	   (Berg,	  1995).	  This	  game	  involves	  two	  participants:	  
the	  first	  one	  (the	  Investor)	  is	  endowed	  with	  a	  sum	  of	  money	  (z)	  he	  may	  invest	  in	  full	  or	  in	  part	  (x)	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with	  a	  second	  participant,	  knowing	  he	  may	  also	  decide	  to	  keep	  the	  entire	  sum	  to	  himself	  and	  not	  
invest	  anything.	   If	  he	  decides	   to	   invest	   something	   (x>0),	   the	  money	   invested	  gets	   tripled	  by	   the	  
experimenters,	   in	  order	  to	  simulate	  the	  effects	  of	  a	  real	   investment.	  The	  tripled	  sum	  (3x)	  is	  then	  
transferred	  to	  a	  second	  participant	  (the	  Trustee),	  who	  may	  then	  independently	  decide	  how	  much	  
(y),	   if	   any,	   to	   return	   to	   the	   first	   participant.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   game	   is	   common	   knowledge	  
across	  participants.	  
Figure	  1:	  Structure	  of	  the	  Trust	  Game	  (own	  elaboration)	  
	  
Total	  earnings	  for	  the	  Investor	  amount	  to	  the	  sum	  between	  the	  share	  of	  the	  initial	  sum	  that	  has	  
not	  been	  invested	  (z-­‐x)	  and	  how	  much	  is	  returned	  by	  the	  Trustee	  (y);	  total	  earnings	  for	  the	  Trustee	  
are	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   tripled	   investment	   by	   the	   Investor	   (3x)	   and	   how	  much	   he/she	  
returns	  (y).	  In	  general,	  the	  sum	  transferred	  from	  the	  Investor	  to	  the	  Trustee	  (x)	  is	  used	  to	  measure	  
trust,	   while	   the	   amount	   returned	   by	   the	   Trustee	   to	   the	   Investor	   is	   used	   to	   measure	  
trustworthiness.	  
The	   trust	   game	   allows	   capturing	   important	   features	   of	   the	   trust	   process	   with	   a	   very	   simple	  
structure;	   in	   particular,	   the	   game	   structure	   allows	   for	   a	   straightforward	   theoretical	   equilibrium	  
that	   serves	   as	   a	   useful	   benchmark	   to	   classify	   observed	   behavior.	   In	   particular,	   using	   backward	  
induction,	  the	  theoretical	  equilibrium	  prescribes	  that	  no	  money	  is	  ever	  invested	  with	  the	  second	  
participant,	  as	  the	  Investor	  correctly	  anticipates	  that	  no	  money	  will	  ever	  be	  returned,	  as	  both	  are	  
assumed	  to	  act	  as	  selfish	  profit	  maximizers.	  	  	  
The	  Trust	  game	  has	  been	  replicated	  both	  in	  the	  laboratory	  and	  in	  field	  experiments	  showing	  that	  a	  
very	   minor	   share	   of	   participants	   actually	   fulfills	   the	   game-­‐theoretic	   predictions,	   making	   no	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investments	   or	   returning	   nothing	   (Johnson,	   Mislin,	   2011)1:	   the	   average	   transfer	   is,	   in	   general,	  
above	  zero.	  
The	  economic	  literature	  has	  used	  the	  Trust	  Game	  to	  address	  the	  reasons	  inducing	  an	  individual	  (an	  
investor)	  to	  trust	  another	  (a	  consultant	  or	  financial	  intermediary)	  with	  his	  money,	  identifying	  two	  
main	   drivers	   of	   trust:	   anticipated	   reciprocation	   (how	   much	   one	   expects	   will	   be	   returned)	   and	  
adherence	  to	  a	  social	  norm	  of	  trusting	  (professionals	  are	  to	  be	  trusted	  because	  of	  their	  role).	  For	  
instance	  Bicchieri	   (2011)	   finds	  how	  trust	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  social	  norm,	  but	   is	  a	  measure	  of	  
anticipated	  reciprocation,	  with	  social	  norms	  more	  salient	  in	  deciding	  how	  much	  to	  return.	  On	  the	  
other	   hand,	   Cox	   (2004)	   finds	   that	   both	   drivers	   apply	   in	   context	   of	   one-­‐shot	   anonymous	  
interactions,	   showing	   how	   the	   literature	   is	   not	   yet	   unanimous	   on	   what	   ultimately	   determines	  
trust.	  
Economics,	  sociology	  and	  psychology	  have	  addressed	  the	  determinants	  of	  trust	  and	  continue	  to	  do	  
so	  in	  light	  of	  the	  important	  implications	  of	  trust	  on	  social	  and	  economic	  transactions	  we	  face	  every	  
day:	   from	  choosing	  which	   clauses	   to	   include	   in	   a	   contract,	   to	   employer-­‐employee	   relationships,	  
trust	  reduces	  transaction	  costs.	  
In	   a	   context	   of	   increasing	   uncertainty	   regarding	   financial	   markets,	   addressing	   which	   are	   the	  
determinants	  of	   trust	   in	  professionals	  becomes	  a	   viable	  avenue	   to	   support	  market	  participation	  
and	   protect	   clients	   and	   agents	   both	   now	   and	   in	   the	   future,	   making	   this	   research	   relevant	   for	  
financial	  institutions	  and	  policy	  makers.	  
	  
II. The	  experiment	  
The	   data	   used	   in	   this	   article	   were	   collected	   during	   a	   public	   event	   organized	   by	   Ca’	   Foscari	  
University	   of	   Venice	   called	   Research	   Night	   (RN)	   held	   on	   September	   27,	   2013	   and	   through	   the	  
social	   network	   Facebook	   (FB)	   between	   March	   14	   and	   March	   22,	   2014.	   Overall	   159	   valid	  
questionnaires	   have	  been	   collected	   from	  voluntary	   participants,	  who	   remained	   anonymous	   and	  
have	  not	  received	  any	  economic	  incentive2.	  The	  experiment	  was	  run	  in	  Italian.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Johnson	  e	  Mislin	  (2011)	  compare	  162	  different	  trust	  game	  experiments	  showing	  how	  in	  all	  cases	  the	  average	  transfer	  
is	  above	  zero,	  despite	  a	  large	  variability	  in	  average	  transfers	  across	  studies.	  	  
2	  The	  participants	  have	  not	  received	  any	  monetary	  compensation	  for	  their	  participation.	  
	   8	  
Given	   that	   the	   goal	   of	   this	   research	   is	   to	   identify	   the	   reasons	   supporting	   trust	   in	   financial	  
intermediaries,	   all	   participants	   in	   the	   study	   have	   been	   assigned	   the	   role	   of	   investors	   –	   the	  
participant	  who	  decides	  how	  much	  to	  transfer	  of	  his	  endowment	  to	  a	  trustee3.	  	  
The	   experiment	   is	   hypothetical	   in	   that	   participants	   were	   informed	   before	  making	   their	   choices	  
that	   their	   actions	   would	   not	   translate	   into	   a	   monetary	   gain,	   differently	   from	   what	   normally	  
happens	  in	  a	  classic	  economic	  experiment4.	  
The	  experiment	   is	  based	  on	  a	  questionnaire5	  presented	   in	  web	   format	   to	   the	  participants	  using	  
three	  laptop	  computers	  during	  the	  Research	  Night	  and	  by	  distributing	  the	  link	  through	  Facebook.	  
The	  questionnaire	  is	  made	  up	  of	  three	  parts,	  presented	  to	  all	  participants	  in	  the	  same	  order:	  	  
1. Financial	  literacy	  (questions	  borrowed	  from	  Lusardi	  [2007]);	  
2. Trust	  game;	  
3. Socio-­‐demographic	  information.	  
Part	  1	  (Financial	  literacy)	  includes	  5	  multiple-­‐answer	  questions	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  knowledge	  
of	   some	   basic	   finance	   concepts	   such	   as	   compound	   interest	   or	   inflation.	   Each	   question	   offers	   4	  
possible	  answers,	  the	  last	  of	  which	  is	  “I	  do	  not	  know”	  in	  all	  questions.	  	  
After	  completing	  all	  five	  questions,	  the	  software	  returns	  the	  number	  of	  correct	  answers	  provided.	  
The	  second	  part	   is	  structured	  as	  a	  classic	  trust	  game	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  how	  perceived	  literacy	  
affects	  trust.	  The	  game	  is	  introduced	  by	  a	  short	  description	  in	  which	  all	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  
clearly	   stated.	   The	   experiment	   is	   structured	   along	   three	   different	   treatments,	   differing	   in	   the	  
information	  provided	  regarding	  the	  financial	  literacy	  of	  the	  player	  who	  will	  receive	  their	  transfer.	  
In	  the	  baseline	  treatment,	  no	  information	  is	  provided	  regarding	  financial	  literacy,	  while	  the	  other	  
(information)	  treatments	   inform	  the	  participants	  they	  are	  playing	  with	  a	  trustee	  that	   is	  more	  (or	  
less)	  literate	  than	  they	  are.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  all	  participants	  undergo	  the	  financial	  literacy	  section	  right	  before	  
the	   trust	  game,	   receiving	  a	   feedback	  on	   their	  actual	  performance.	  Moreover,	  participants	   in	   the	  
information	  treatments	  receive	  instructions	  that	  clearly	  state	  that	  the	  only	  information	  regarding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  the	  experiment,	  the	  trustee	  is	  simply	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  second	  player.	  This	  second	  player	  is	  a	  fictitious	  one,	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  the	  choices	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  not	  matched	  with	  real	  choices	  from	  other	  participants	  called	  in	  to	  fill	  
the	  role	  of	  trustees.	  This	  choice	  is	  coherent	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  entire	  experiment	  is	  hypothetical.	  To	  provide	  a	  more	  
enjoyable	  experience	  to	  the	  participants,	  some	  fictitious	  trustee	  responses	  were	  created	  and	  the	  software	  randomly	  
assigned	  them	  to	  players.	  This	  simply	  allowed	  them	  to	  walk	  away	  with	  a	   full	  perception	  of	   the	  game,	  but	   it	  did	  not	  
affect	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  game,	  as	  participants	  knew	  for	  the	  start	  that	  no	  monetary	  payment	  will	  be	  offered	  to	  them	  
for	  their	  participation.	  
4	  In	  a	  classic	  economic	  experiments,	  total	  earnings	  will	  be	  computed	  following	  Figure	  1,	  mirroring	  real	  choices	  made	  
during	  the	  experiment.	  
5	  Available	  upon	  request.	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the	  second	  player	  they	  are	  about	  to	  receive	  is	  whether	  he	  is	  more	  or	   less	   literate	  than	  they	  are,	  
where	   literacy	   has	   been	   assessed	   through	   the	   same	   questionnaire	   they	   just	   completed.	   This	  
information	  is	  reinforced	  by	  stating	  precisely	  in	  the	  instructions	  of	  the	  information	  treatments	  that	  
“the	  other	  player	  scored	  higher	  (lower)	  than	  you	  in	  the	  financial	  quiz”.	  
Before	   receiving	   the	   feedback	   on	   how	  much	   is	   returned	   (through	   the	   random	  mechanisms)	   all	  
participants	  have	  to	  complete	  the	  third	  section	  of	  the	  questionnaire,	  regarding	  socio-­‐demographic	  
information	  such	  as:	  
• Age,	  income,	  gender,	  profession	  and	  education;	  
• Risk	  aversion	  and	  financial	  experience.	  
Once	  this	  last	  section	  is	  completed	  the	  software	  presents	  the	  (random)	  feedback	  on	  the	  returned	  




A. Sample	  description	  
Our	  sample	  is	  composed	  by	  159	  subjects,	  86	  interviewed	  during	  the	  “Research	  Night”	  (RN)	  
and	  73	  through	  the	  Facebook	  (FB)	  campaign	  (Table	  1).	  	  
	  
	   RN	   FB	   Total	  
Male	   41	   40	   81	  
Female	   45	   33	   78	  
Total	   86	   73	   159	  
	  	  
Table	  1:	  Participants	  
	  
Before	   analyzing	   the	   data,	   we	   tested	   the	   possibility	   to	   use	   together	   the	   two	   samples.	   In	   fact,	  
although	   we	   used	   the	   same	   questionnaire	   in	   the	   two	   samples,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   verify	   if	   the	  
physical	   presence	   of	   the	   interviewer,	   even	   if	   not	   intrusive,	   and	   the	   different	   context	   (collective	  
during	  the	  Research	  Night	  and	  individual	  in	  the	  Facebook	  session)	  had	  different	  effects	  in	  the	  two	  
cases.	  	  The	  statistical	  analysis	  confirmed	  that	  financial	  decisions	  taken	  in	  the	  cases	  RN	  and	  FB	  were	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not	   statistically	   different,	   thus	   the	   two	   samples	   can	   be	   analyzed	   together	   (Wilcoxon’s	   test,	   p-­‐
value=0.946).	  
Figure	  2	  summarizes	  demographic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  entire	  sample	  involved	  in	  our	  experiment.	  	  
	  
	  
Figura	  2	  –	  Demographic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  sample	  
	  
As	  Figure	  2	   shows,	  participants	  were	  young	   (about	  80%	  of	   the	   sample	   is	   younger	   than	  40	  years	  
old),	  highly	  educated	  (about	  80%	  has	  a	  Master	  or	  Doctoral	  degree),	  with	  low-­‐income	  level	  (about	  
80%	  earns	   less	  than	  30.000€.	  per	  year).	  However,	  students	  are	  only	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  total	  
sample	  (33%).	  
	  
B. Trust:	  transferring	  and	  hypotheses	  testing	  
One	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   this	   experiment	   is	   to	   understand	   whether	   having	   information	   about	   the	  
financial	  literacy	  of	  intermediaries	  influences	  the	  trust	  level	  of	  investors.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  to	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Wilcoxon’s	  test	  (Wilcoxon,	  1945)	  is	  a	  non	  parametric	  test	  which	  aims	  at	  identifying	  if	  two	  data	  series	  can	  come	  from	  
the	  same	  distribution.	  The	  test	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  two	  data	  series	  are	  statistically	  different,	  and	  it	  is	  rejected	  when	  the	  
p-­‐value	  is	  above	  the	  0.10	  threshold.	  When	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  rejected	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  two	  data	  series	  can	  
be	  treated	  as	   if	   they	  come	  from	  the	  same	  distribution.	  The	  use	  of	  non	  parametric	   tests	   is	   frequent	   in	  experimental	  
research	   since	   the	   limited	   number	   of	   observations	   and	   data	   characteristics	   often	   affect	   hypotheses’	   validity	   of	   the	  
more	  common	  parametric	  tests.	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research	   question,	   the	   experiment	   includes	   three	   different	   treatments	   and,	   to	   avoid	  
contamination	  between	  them,	  each	  individuals	  participated	  in	  only	  one	  treatment:	  
• 78	   persons	   were	   involved	   in	   the	   “no	   info”	   treatment,	   where	   no	   information	   about	  
intermediary’s	  financial	  literacy	  was	  provided;	  
• 30	   persons	   participated	   in	   the	   treatment	  where	   the	   intermediary	   had	   a	   higher	   financial	  
literacy	  level	  (“info_sup”);	  	  
• 51	  persons	  participated	  in	  the	  treatment	  where	  the	  intermediary	  was	  described	  as	  having	  a	  
lower	  financial	  literacy	  level	  (“info_inf”).	  
Figure	  3	  shows	   the	   investments	  distributions	   (money	   transferred	   to	   intermediaries)	   in	   the	   three	  
treatments.	  The	  comparison	  among	  the	  three	  (Kruskal	  Wallis	  test7)	  does	  not	  show	  any	  significant	  
differences,	  but	  this	  can	  be	  partially	  due	  to	  sample	  numerosity.	  Thus,	  it	  cannot	  be	  concluded	  with	  
sufficient	  statistical	  certainty	  whether	  different	  types	  of	  information	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  trust	  
level	  between	  investors	  and	  intermediaries	  or	  not.	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Kruskal	  Wallis	  test	  is	  a	  non-­‐parametric	  test	  which	  allows	  to	  verify	  wether	  three	  (or	  more)	  data	  series	  are	  statistically	  
different	  (Kruskal	  e	  Wallis,	  1952).	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Figure	  3:	  Comparison	  among	  investments	  distributions	  of	  the	  three	  treatments	  and	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  test.	  
	  
On	   the	  contrary,	   a	   significant	   statistical	  difference	  can	  be	  observed	   in	   the	   investor-­‐intermediary	  
transfers	   comparing	   the	   case	   in	  which	   some	   information	   about	   intermediary’s	   financial	   literacy	  
level	   is	   given	   (“info”,	  merging	   the	  “info_sup”	  and	  “info_inf”	   treatments)	  and	   the	  case	  where	  no	  
information	   is	   provided	   (Figure	   4).	   Wilcoxon	   test	   supports	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   in	   case	   of	   no	  
information,	   investments	  are	   significantly	  higher	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  other	   case	   (p-­‐value=0.088).	  
Thus,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  having	  information	  about	  the	  intermediary’s	  financial	  literacy	  affects	  the	  




Figure	  4:	  Comparison	  between	  investments	  of	  no	  info	  and	  info	  treatments.	  
	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  explore	  possible	  motivations	  behind	  the	  trust	  level	  of	  investors	  towards	  intermediaries	  
we	  also	  looked	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  other	  variables	  (besides	  financial	  literacy)	  where	  the	  literature	  does	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  A	  p-­‐value	  lower	  than	  0.10	  supports	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  two	  data	  series	  are	  statistically	  different.	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not	  offer	  conclusive	   results.	  An	   interesting	   result	  emerges	   from	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	   relationships	  
between	   investments	   and	   investors’	   risk	   propensities.	   Recall	   that	   a	   specific	   section	   of	   the	  
questionnaire	   was	   dedicated	   to	   identify	   three	   investors’	   risk	   profiles:	   (1)	   risk	   averse,	   (2)	   risk	  
neutral,	  (3)	  risk	  lover.	  	  
These	  results	  show	  how	  different	  risk	  propensities	  lead	  to	  different	  trust	  choices,	  not	  only	  from	  a	  
descriptive	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  also	  at	   statistical	   level	   (Kruskal	  Wallis	   test	   sustains	   the	  hypothesis	  
that	  different	  risk	  profiles	  result	  in	  investments	  significantly	  different	  with	  a	  p-­‐value=0.04).	  	  
In	  order	   to	   further	   investigate	   the	   relationship	  between	   risk	  propensity	  and	   trust	  we	   run	  a	   logit	  
regression.	   Our	   dependent	   variable	   is	   Trust,	   measured	   through	   a	   binary	   variable	   distinguishing	  
investments	  above	  (Trust=1)	  and	  below	  (Trust=	  0)	  a	  defined	  threshold	  (identified	  with	  the	  median	  




where	  xβ	  =	  β1,	  β2x2,	  …	  βkxk,	  and	  G(z)	  is	  the	  cumulative	  probability	  function	  which	  links	  xβ	  to	  the	  
answer	  probability	  (Wooldridge,	  2001).	  In	  the	  logit	  model,	  where	  G(z)	  is	  the	  logistic	  function,	  the	  
effect	  of	  xj	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  making	  an	  investment	  above	  the	  median,	  is	  given	  by	  the	  sign	  of	  βj.	  
Our	  main	  independent	  variable	  is	  the	  Risk	  Propensity,	  to	  which	  we	  added	  two	  control	  variables	  as	  
suggested	  by	  the	  literature.	  Our	  model	  can	  be	  formalized	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
Trust	  =	  Education	  +	  Income	  +	  Risk	  propensity	  +	  ξ	  
	  
Results	  of	  the	  logit	  regression	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  2.	  
	  
	   Coefficients	   Std.	  Error	   p-­‐value	  
Intercept	   -­‐2,3272	   0,8655	   0,0072**	  
Education	   0,3222	   0,2274	   0,1566	  
Income	   0,3218	   0,1633	   0,0487*	  
Risk	  propensity	   0,9621	   0,3632	   0,0081**	  
Significance:	  ‘***’	  0.001,	  ‘**’	  0.01,	  ‘*’	  0.05,	  ‘	  ’	  1	  
Null	  deviance:	  213.52	  on	  158	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  
Residual	  deviance:	  199.00	  on	  155	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  
AIC:207	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Table	  2:	  Logit	  Regression.	  
	  
	  
The	   logit	  analysis	  confirms	  the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  risk	  propensity	  
and	   trust,	   showing	   a	   positive	   correlation	   between	   the	   two	   variables.	   The	   interpretation	   of	   this	  
result	  is	  that	  risk	  lovers	  and	  risk	  neutral	  individuals	  make	  significantly	  higher	  transfers	  with	  respect	  
to	  risk-­‐averse	  investors,	  showing	  a	  higher	  propensity	  to	  trust	  intermediaries.	  
Moreover,	  the	  analysis	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  no	  differences	  between	  investors	  with	  different	  levels	  
of	  education,	  showing	  a	  statistically	  insignificant	  coefficient.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  control	  variable	  
Income	  is	  an	  explicative	  variable	  of	  investors’	  trust	  towards	  intermediaries.	  The	  positive	  coefficient	  




4. Discussion	  and	  conclusions	  
	  
The	  main	   aim	   of	   this	   research	   was	   to	   investigate,	   through	   an	   experimental	   analysis,	   two	  main	  
hypotheses:	  (1)	  whether	  investors	  show	  higher	  levels	  of	  trust	  towards	  intermediaries	  with	  a	  higher	  
level	  of	  financial	   literacy	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  own	  or	  not;	  (2)	  whether	  having	  information	  about	  
the	  intermediary’s	  financial	  literacy	  affects	  investors’	  trust,	  independently	  from	  their	  own	  level	  of	  
financial	  literacy.	  
The	  literature	  review	  showed	  how	  trust	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  particular	  relevance	  in	  the	  field	  of	  financial	  
investments,	  even	   if	   it	   is	  not	  very	  easy	   to	  draw	  normative	  conclusions.	  The	   results	  presented	   in	  
this	   paper	   support	   only	   hypothesis	   (2),	   namely	   that	   having	   information	   about	   intermediaries	  
influences	  trust	   levels	  of	   investors;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  hypothesis	  (1)	   is	  not	  supported	  by	  our	  data.	  
However,	   results	   supporting	   hypothesis	   (2)	   are	   somehow	   surprising,	   since	   they	   show	   that	  
investors’	  trust	  is	  negatively	  affected	  by	  information	  about	  intermediaries.	  Respondents	  informed	  
of	   the	   intermediaries’	   financial	   literacy	   level,	   in	   fact,	   made	   lower	   investments,	   showing	   lower	  
levels	  of	  trust	  -­‐	  differently	  from	  what	  expected.	  	  
This	   result	   can	   be	   interpreted	   looking	   at	   the	   investment	   process:	   giving	   information	   about	  
intermediaries’	   financial	   literacy	   levels	  seems	  to	  make	   investors	   focus	  on	  the	  evaluation	  of	   their	  
counterpart,	  making	  a	  comparison	  between	  their	  own	  ability	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  other	  player.	  
	   15	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  participants	  playing	  with	  no	  information,	  seem	  to	  follow	  a	  social	  norm,	  trusting	  
the	  counterpart	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  personal	  attitudes.	  
Experimental	  results	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  if	  the	  goal	  were	  increasing	  investors’	  participation	  in	  the	  
financial	  market,	  financial	  organizations	  would	  not	  have	  any	  benefit	   in	  introducing	  a	  certification	  
system	  on	   their	   own	   intermediaries’	   professionalism,	   since	   it	   could	  produce	  negative	   results	   on	  
investors’	  participation	  decisions.	  
On	  the	  other	  side,	  if	  the	  trust	  process	  is	  mediated	  mostly	  by	  social	  norms,	  it	  seems	  important	  to	  
understand	  in	  which	  ways	  to	  present	  intermediaries	  and	  which	  financial	  information	  can	  stimulate	  
trust	  development.	  	  
Increasing	  participation	  in	  financial	  markets	  remains	  a	  relevant	  theme,	  and	  the	  results	  presented	  
in	   this	  paper	  suggest	   the	  necessity	   to	  develop	   further	  empirical	   investigations	  on	  the	  delegation	  
process	  of	  financial	  decisions	  to	  intermediaries	  on	  behalf	  of	  investors.	  In	  particular,	  an	  interesting	  
path	  to	  further	  develop	  this	  research	  would	  be	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  financial	  literacy	  of	  investors	  
and	   intermediaries	  both	  on	  trust	  and	   interaction	  process	  between	  the	  two	  counterparts.	  Even	   if	  
the	   present	   work	   offers	   several	   suggestions,	   we	   acknowledge	   also	   some	   limitations:	   the	  
experiment	   is	  based	  on	  a	  hypothetical	  questionnaire,	   and	   the	   limited	  data	  numerosity	   inhibited	  
the	   opportunity	   to	   investigate	   other	   relationships	   between	   variables.	   To	   further	   develop	   the	  
present	  work,	  a	  laboratory	  experiment	  could	  be	  developed,	  introducing	  also	  monetary	  incentives	  
for	  participation	  and	  efforts,	  linking	  rewards	  to	  the	  choices	  made	  during	  the	  game.	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